An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Vi Cao*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We use epistemic game theory to explore rationales behind cooperative behaviors in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. For a class of type structures that are sufficiently rich, the set of outcomes that can arise when each player i is rational and satisfies (mi- 1) th order strong belief of rationality is the set of paths on which each player i defects in the last mi rounds. We construct one sufficiently rich type structure to elaborate on how different patterns of cooperative behaviors arise under sufficiently weak epistemic conditions. In this type structure, the optimality of forgiving the opponent’s past defection and the belief that one’s defection will be forgiven account for the richness of the set of behavior outcomes.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)53-85
Number of pages33
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2022
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Epistemic game
  • Prisoner’s Dilemma
  • Strong belief of rationality

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this