TY - JOUR
T1 - Retailer’s optimal CSR investment in closed-loop supply chains
T2 - The impacts of supply chain structure and channel power structure
AU - Zheng, Benrong
AU - Jin, Liang
AU - Huang, Guoxuan
AU - Chu, Jie
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank the Editors and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, which significantly improve the quality of this paper. This study is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [No. 72102084, 71902079, 72101208], the Social Science Foundation of Education Ministry of China [No. 19YJC630229], and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [No. 2662020JGPYG14].
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2022/6/7
Y1 - 2022/6/7
N2 - This paper studies the retailer’s optimal corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment decisions in manufacturer-collecting closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). We establish a centralized and two decentralized models with and without considering the retailer’s CSR investment. The impacts of the supply chain structure and channel power structure on the retailer’s CSR investment decisions are analyzed. We find that (i) the retailer increases CSR investment as the remanufacturing cost savings increase or the collection cost reduces; (ii) the retailer is more willing to make a CSR investment in the centralized model than in the decentralized models; (iii) the CSR effort level in the manufacturer-led model is higher than that in the retailer-led model; and (iv) when the unit cost of CSR investment is moderate, retailer’s CSR investment benefits the retailer while harming the manufacturer; however, CSR investment always leads to a “win–win” situation when the retailer is the channel leader. Finally, we carry out numerical studies to investigate the effects of model parameters on supply chain equilibrium.
AB - This paper studies the retailer’s optimal corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment decisions in manufacturer-collecting closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). We establish a centralized and two decentralized models with and without considering the retailer’s CSR investment. The impacts of the supply chain structure and channel power structure on the retailer’s CSR investment decisions are analyzed. We find that (i) the retailer increases CSR investment as the remanufacturing cost savings increase or the collection cost reduces; (ii) the retailer is more willing to make a CSR investment in the centralized model than in the decentralized models; (iii) the CSR effort level in the manufacturer-led model is higher than that in the retailer-led model; and (iv) when the unit cost of CSR investment is moderate, retailer’s CSR investment benefits the retailer while harming the manufacturer; however, CSR investment always leads to a “win–win” situation when the retailer is the channel leader. Finally, we carry out numerical studies to investigate the effects of model parameters on supply chain equilibrium.
KW - CSR investment
KW - Channel power structure
KW - Closed-loop supply chain
KW - Manufacturer-collecting
KW - Supply chain structure
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85131556563&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10288-022-00512-6
DO - 10.1007/s10288-022-00512-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85131556563
SN - 1619-4500
VL - 21
SP - 301
EP - 327
JO - 4OR
JF - 4OR
IS - 2
ER -
