Abstract
In this paper, we apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the Rubinstein's Basic Alternating- Offer Bargaining Problem, and compare our experimental results with its analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA employs an alternative set of assumptions on the players' behaviors. Experimental outcomes suggest that the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of Evolutionary Algorithms, is able to generate convincing approximations of the theoretic solutions. The major advantages of EA over the game-theoretic analysis are its flexibility and ease of application to variants of Rubinstein Bargaining Problems and complicated bargaining situations for which theoretic solutions are unavailable.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages | 211-217 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games, CIG'05 - Colchester, Essex, United Kingdom Duration: 4 Apr 2005 → 6 Apr 2005 |
Conference
| Conference | 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games, CIG'05 |
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| Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
| City | Colchester, Essex |
| Period | 4/04/05 → 6/04/05 |