Was Gongsun Long a Logician?—Examining the Baima Dilemma with the Principles of Categorical Logic

“Baima fei ma白馬非馬,” ascribed to Gongsun Long and conventionally translated as “White horse is not a horse,” stands amongst the most puzzling yet intriguing propositions in the long history of Chinese thought. As much as Gongsun Long’s Baima (White horse) dilemma was denounced as a “glib talk” by contemporaries, it gained the attention of modern scholars. Some (Chmielewski, 1962) then saw it as proof of the existence of logical intuition in pre-Qin China; some (Graham, 1989/2003) held an opposite view. This paper aims to re-examine Gongsun Long’s argumentation regarding the status of the “white horse” using some basic principles of categorical logic. With rudimentary logical tools, this paper then attempts to excavate the presumed logical intuition buried first under the “vehement criticism” of his contemporaries and then under the “over-expectations” of modern scholars. It will argue that with the Baima dilemma, Gongsun Long aimed not for sophistry or sheer glibbery but for orderliness and clarity. Despite lacking the elegance and rigour of Aristotelian syllogism, Gongsun Long’s argumentation was then determined by similar motivation and embodied similar principles as the ones underpinning the endeavour of the Socratic tradition.