TY - JOUR
T1 - Technical assistance, inspection regime, and corporate social responsibility performance
T2 - A behavioural perspective
AU - Tong, Xun
AU - Chen, Jianghang
AU - Zhu, Qinghua
AU - Cheng, T. C.E.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2018/12
Y1 - 2018/12
N2 - Corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues in suppliers can affect the reputation of buyers or even result in supply chain disruption. Thus, buyer and supplier firms are urged to comply with CSR codes in a coordinated manner. In other words, multinational buyers are expected to extend CSR practices to their suppliers in emerging countries. This is particularly crucial when suppliers’ CSR performance is screened under a regulatory agency's inspection regime. To this end, this study formulates an analytical model to understand the effects of buying firms’ supportive schemes, i.e., technical assistance programmes, on their partner suppliers’ CSR performance. Specifically, we develop a multi-period behavioural model to simulate a system consisting of multiple buyers and suppliers where the government regularly conducts inspections on suppliers’ CSR performance. The results from the agent-based simulation analysis shed light on (1) how the dyadic risk preferences of suppliers and buyers affect suppliers’ CSR performance; (2) how the gap between the perceived and actual CSR levels in a supplier interacts with the regulatory agency's tactics to influence suppliers’ CSR performance; (3) the extent to which the overall suppliers’ CSR performance improvement is attributable to the buyers’ technical assistance programmes under the regulatory agency's inspection regime. This research contributes to the socially responsible supply chain management literature and provides innovative managerial insights for policy makers (e.g., CSR regulators) to promote CSR practices among suppliers.
AB - Corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues in suppliers can affect the reputation of buyers or even result in supply chain disruption. Thus, buyer and supplier firms are urged to comply with CSR codes in a coordinated manner. In other words, multinational buyers are expected to extend CSR practices to their suppliers in emerging countries. This is particularly crucial when suppliers’ CSR performance is screened under a regulatory agency's inspection regime. To this end, this study formulates an analytical model to understand the effects of buying firms’ supportive schemes, i.e., technical assistance programmes, on their partner suppliers’ CSR performance. Specifically, we develop a multi-period behavioural model to simulate a system consisting of multiple buyers and suppliers where the government regularly conducts inspections on suppliers’ CSR performance. The results from the agent-based simulation analysis shed light on (1) how the dyadic risk preferences of suppliers and buyers affect suppliers’ CSR performance; (2) how the gap between the perceived and actual CSR levels in a supplier interacts with the regulatory agency's tactics to influence suppliers’ CSR performance; (3) the extent to which the overall suppliers’ CSR performance improvement is attributable to the buyers’ technical assistance programmes under the regulatory agency's inspection regime. This research contributes to the socially responsible supply chain management literature and provides innovative managerial insights for policy makers (e.g., CSR regulators) to promote CSR practices among suppliers.
KW - Behavioural
KW - Buyer-supplier relationship
KW - Corporate social responsibility
KW - Inspection
KW - Multi-period
KW - Technical assistance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85054685267&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.09.027
DO - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.09.027
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85054685267
SN - 0925-5273
VL - 206
SP - 59
EP - 69
JO - International Journal of Production Economics
JF - International Journal of Production Economics
ER -