TY - JOUR
T1 - Speed competition and strategic trading
AU - He, Xue Zhong
AU - Kang, Junqing
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2025/6
Y1 - 2025/6
N2 - Speed competition incentivizes fast traders to trade earlier and temporally fragments the price discovery process. Large traders internalize their price impact and screen trading aggressiveness to resolve the pre-trading uncertainty proportional to the number of traders. Therefore, price discovery in the late period depends on the number of slow traders and the amount of fundamental uncertainty resolved by fast traders. A concentration of fast or slow traders harms price discovery in the late period, generating hump-shape overall price informativeness to speed competition. With fast information diffusion, speed competition harms the overall price informativeness, unless fast traders are high-frequency traders.
AB - Speed competition incentivizes fast traders to trade earlier and temporally fragments the price discovery process. Large traders internalize their price impact and screen trading aggressiveness to resolve the pre-trading uncertainty proportional to the number of traders. Therefore, price discovery in the late period depends on the number of slow traders and the amount of fundamental uncertainty resolved by fast traders. A concentration of fast or slow traders harms price discovery in the late period, generating hump-shape overall price informativeness to speed competition. With fast information diffusion, speed competition harms the overall price informativeness, unless fast traders are high-frequency traders.
KW - Information diffusion
KW - Price informativeness
KW - Speed competition
KW - Strategic trading
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105000483352&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.finmar.2025.100972
DO - 10.1016/j.finmar.2025.100972
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105000483352
SN - 1386-4181
VL - 74
JO - Journal of Financial Markets
JF - Journal of Financial Markets
M1 - 100972
ER -