Reinforcement learning and rational expectations equilibrium in limit order markets

Xuan Zhou, Shen Lin, Xue Zhong He*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper shows that simple payoff-based reinforcement learning can help to achieve rational expectations equilibrium in limit order markets. In equilibrium, speculators mainly supply liquidity, while liquidity consumption increases in the private values of no-speculators with intrinsic motives for trade. Driven by information acquisition of the non-speculators, liquidity consumption is hump-shaped in fundamental volatility for the speculators but U-shaped for the non-speculators. In contrast, liquidity supply decreases in fundamental volatility for the speculators but is hump-shaped for the non-speculators. Unlike the informed traders who trade on asset fundamentals, the uninformed traders trade more on order book and trading information.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104991
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume172
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2025

Keywords

  • Limit order market
  • Liquidity supply and consumption
  • Rational expectations
  • Reinforcement learning

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Reinforcement learning and rational expectations equilibrium in limit order markets'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this