Reinforcement learning and rational expectation equilibrium in limit order markets

Xuan Zhou, Shen Lin, Xue-Zhong He

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper shows that simple payoff-based reinforcement learning can help to achieve rational expectations equilibrium in limit order markets. In equilibrium, speculators mainly supply liquidity, while liquidity consumption increases in the private values of no-speculators with an intrinsic motive for trade. Driven by information acquisition of the non-speculators, liquidity consumption is hump-shaped in fundamental volatility for the speculators but U-shaped for the non-speculators. In contrast, liquidity supply decreases in fundamental volatility for the speculators but is hump-shaped for the non-speculators. Unlike the informed traders who trade on asset fundamentals, the uninformed traders trade more on order book and trading
information.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2024

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