Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information

Haifeng Fu, Yeneng Sun*, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhixiang Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We introduce a new game form which allows the players' strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players' payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players' strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)523-531
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume43
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007
Externally publishedYes

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Fu, H., Sun, Y., Yannelis, N. C., & Zhang, Z. (2007). Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 43(5), 523-531. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001