On the existence of Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with infinite actions

Haifeng Fu*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We show that each mixed strategy of a normal-form game can be reformulated as a pure strategy of an induced Bayesian game. Moreover, a normal-form game has a Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if its induced Bayesian game has a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. By relying on the existence result of Pareto undominated pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games in Fu and Yu (2015), we also show that every normal-form game has a Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Article number109771
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume201
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2021

Keywords

  • Bayesian game
  • Normal-form game
  • Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
  • Pareto undominated pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium

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Fu, H. (2021). On the existence of Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with infinite actions. Economics Letters, 201, Article 109771. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109771