Abstract
We show that each mixed strategy of a normal-form game can be reformulated as a pure strategy of an induced Bayesian game. Moreover, a normal-form game has a Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if its induced Bayesian game has a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. By relying on the existence result of Pareto undominated pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games in Fu and Yu (2015), we also show that every normal-form game has a Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 109771 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 201 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2021 |
Keywords
- Bayesian game
- Normal-form game
- Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
- Pareto undominated pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
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Fu, H. (2021). On the existence of Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with infinite actions. Economics Letters, 201, Article 109771. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109771