Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information

Haifeng Fu

doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0315-7

Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information

Haifeng Fu^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

National University of Singapore

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria for games with private and public information under general conditions. Under the additional assumptions of finiteness of action spaces and diffuseness and conditional independence of private information, a strong purification result is obtained for the mixed strategies in such games. As a corollary, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria follows.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	521-532
Number of pages	12
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	37
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0315-7
Publication status	Published - Dec 2008
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Gameswith private and public information
Mixed-strategy equilibrium
Pure-strategy equilibrium
Strong purification

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10.1007/s00199-007-0315-7

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abstract = "This paper shows the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria for games with private and public information under general conditions. Under the additional assumptions of finiteness of action spaces and diffuseness and conditional independence of private information, a strong purification result is obtained for the mixed strategies in such games. As a corollary, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria follows.",

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AB - This paper shows the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria for games with private and public information under general conditions. Under the additional assumptions of finiteness of action spaces and diffuseness and conditional independence of private information, a strong purification result is obtained for the mixed strategies in such games. As a corollary, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria follows.

KW - Gameswith private and public information

KW - Mixed-strategy equilibrium

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KW - Strong purification

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Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information

Abstract

Keywords

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