In search of blue water power: The PLA navy’s maritime strategy in the 1990s

In 1974 the Chinese navy clashed with Vietnam in the Xisha (Paracel) Islands. Although the PLA navy (PLAN) scored better, its difficult victory over a stronger naval enemy alarmed the command of the PLA. Shortly after the incident, a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission (CMC) was convened and, at Mao’s personal intervention, a decision was taken to quickly boost the navy’s equipment. Yet the navy’s modernization efforts did not bear fruit until well into the 1980s. The threat of Soviet land invasion had dominated the PLA’s strategic thinking. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping endorsed a naval proposal for speedy equipment upgrading. In 1985, the navy announced that its maritime strategy would be shifted from passive brown water defence to active green water defence.¹The document stipulated that the navy modernization must enable it to obtain better firepower in an offshore conflict, to exercise effective control over the sea transportation lines radiating from China’s territorial waters, and to conduct warfare in the waters adjacent to China.²Based on this changed military thinking, the navy began to expand its green water fleet and strategic nuclear forces. The last years of the 1980s saw a new element added to the strategy: the ‘open-ocean training programme’, which is viewed as preparation for the navy’s exercise of blue water power in the next century.3 As part of this evolution, it is planned to build aircraft carriers, large surface ships and new aircraft for the carrier-headed missions. When this plan is translated into practice in 20 years’ time, the navy’s strength will take on a new look. This paper is an attempt to assess the navy’s strategy in the 1990s and at the same time analyse its logical development.