Improved cryptanalysis of HFEv- via projection

Jintai Ding, Ray Perlner, Albrecht Petzoldt, Daniel Smith-Tone*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book or Report/Conference proceedingConference Proceedingpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The HFEv- signature scheme is one of the most studied multivariate schemes and one of the major candidates for the upcoming standardization of post-quantum digital signature schemes. In this paper, we propose three new attack strategies against HFEv-, each of them using the idea of projection. Especially our third attack is very effective and is, for some parameter sets, the most efficient known attack against HFEv-. Furthermore, our attack requires much less memory than direct and rank attacks. By our work, we therefore give new insights in the security of the HFEv- signature scheme and restrictions for the parameter choice of a possible future standardized HFEv- instance.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPost-Quantum Cryptography - 9th International Conference, PQCrypto 2018, Proceedings
EditorsTanja Lange, Rainer Steinwandt
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages375-395
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9783319790626
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes
Event9th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2018 - Fort Lauderdale, United States
Duration: 9 Apr 201811 Apr 2018

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10786 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference9th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityFort Lauderdale
Period9/04/1811/04/18

Keywords

  • Gröbner basis
  • HFEv-
  • MinRank
  • Multivariate cryptography
  • Projection

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