Abstract
This article mainly analyses the strategies' choice on the interaction between the government regulators and groups of listed companies with the evolutionary game theory, a model of asymmetric game between them is set up and why listed companies follow or violate the regulations are discussed, in the train of the steady state of the monitoring activity according to different values of parameters under this analysed condition. Simultaneously, how listed companies and supervisory administrations choose their respective strategies are explained and some suggestions are given for governments in order to prevent the fraud of listed companies.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 295-302 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | WIT Transactions on Engineering Sciences |
| Volume | 80 |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | International Association of Management Science and Engineering Technology - , Hong Kong Duration: 3 Dec 2012 → 5 Dec 2012 |
Keywords
- Evolutionary game
- Financial fraud
- Listed companies
- Supervision mechanism