Cryptanalysis of PASS II and miniPass

Bok Min Goi*, Jintai Ding, M. U. Siddiqi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book or Report/Conference proceedingConference Proceedingpeer-review

Abstract

In ACISP '00, Wu et al. proposed attacks to break the Polynomial Authentication and Signature Scheme (PASS), in particular, they are able to generate valid authentication transcripts and digital signatures without knowing the private key and any previous transcripts/ signatures. They showed that PASS can be broken with around 2338.5 trials. In this paper, we analyze the security of the improved versions of PASS; viz. PASS II and MiniPASS, and extend the Wu et al.'s attacks to PASS II and MiniPASS to break them. Furthermore, we discuss why and how these schemes are broken from the view point of the structure of cryptosystems and point out the fundamental weakness behind.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation and Communications Security - 7th International Conference, ICICS 2005, Proceedings
Pages159-168
Number of pages10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005
Externally publishedYes
Event7th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2005 - Beijing, China
Duration: 10 Dec 200513 Dec 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3783 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference7th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2005
Country/TerritoryChina
CityBeijing
Period10/12/0513/12/05

Keywords

  • Authentication scheme
  • Cryptanalysis
  • Digital signature scheme
  • NTRU
  • Partial polynomial evaluation

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