A model of delegation with a VaR constraint

Rui Guo, Ying Jiang, Ao Li, Zhigang Qiu*, Hefei Wang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes a model of delegated portfolio management, in which professional fund managers face a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. We show that the existence of the VaR constraint impairs the optimal risk sharing in both the trading and delegation stages. As a result, the VaR constraint leads household investors to take excessive risk and may cause the prices of fundamentally uncorrelated assets to be correlated.

Original languageEnglish
Article number101895
JournalFinance Research Letters
Volume42
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Contagion
  • Delegated portfolio management
  • VaR constraint

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