Team versus individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination game

Ananish Chaudhuri*, Tirnud Paichayontvijit, Tony So

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


We compare coordination success of individuals and teams in the minimum effort coordination game. The game is played by groups of either five individuals or five two-person teams with either fixed or random re-matching protocols. When groups are fixed, teams perform at least as well as individuals, if not better, in terms of coordinating to the payoff dominant outcome. But with random re-matching, teams experience pervasive coordination failures. A public recommendation to a strategy or a performance bonus exhorting players to coordinate to the payoff-dominant equilibrium has similar impact on coordination for both individuals and teams playing with fixed matching. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with teams playing under random re-matching. Our results have implications for the design of work-groups in organizations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-102
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Psychology
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • Coordination
  • Performance bonus
  • Recommendation
  • Teams
  • Weak-link games

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