TY - JOUR
T1 - Stigma, hierarchy, and the Eurozone
AU - Giurlando, Philip
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Most attempts to understand the inter-state politics of the Eurozone with the insights of International Relations (IR) theory have examined the question of whether hegemonic stability theory explains the currency's political structure. The underlying social contract assumptions of this framework, this paper argues, exaggerate the amount of consent in the operation of hierarchy and the supposed benefits provided by leading states. Rather, the Eurozone's power hierarchy operates in a more diffuse, decentralized, and unintentional manner. Norms play a decisive role in these types of hierarchies, particularly as they influence financial markets which then pressure secondary states. The analysis makes the following contributions to the field of IR. First, it contributes to the literature that observes how hierarchies can operate without authority–in a decentralized, informal manner–via norms or benchmarks which stigmatize secondary states and pressure them to conform to the leading state. Second, it shows how market actors can be a key mediating variable between international hierarchy, norms, and state-behaviour. Third, it contributes to revealing the deep structures of international politics in a way that moves beyond the binary assumption of international orders as being either anarchical or authority-based.
AB - Most attempts to understand the inter-state politics of the Eurozone with the insights of International Relations (IR) theory have examined the question of whether hegemonic stability theory explains the currency's political structure. The underlying social contract assumptions of this framework, this paper argues, exaggerate the amount of consent in the operation of hierarchy and the supposed benefits provided by leading states. Rather, the Eurozone's power hierarchy operates in a more diffuse, decentralized, and unintentional manner. Norms play a decisive role in these types of hierarchies, particularly as they influence financial markets which then pressure secondary states. The analysis makes the following contributions to the field of IR. First, it contributes to the literature that observes how hierarchies can operate without authority–in a decentralized, informal manner–via norms or benchmarks which stigmatize secondary states and pressure them to conform to the leading state. Second, it shows how market actors can be a key mediating variable between international hierarchy, norms, and state-behaviour. Third, it contributes to revealing the deep structures of international politics in a way that moves beyond the binary assumption of international orders as being either anarchical or authority-based.
KW - European politics
KW - Hierarchy
KW - Italy
KW - anarchy
KW - norms
KW - stigmatization
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85106447333&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/23745118.2021.1928818
DO - 10.1080/23745118.2021.1928818
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85106447333
SN - 2374-5118
VL - 23
SP - 679
EP - 697
JO - European Politics and Society
JF - European Politics and Society
IS - 5
ER -