Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information

Haifeng Fu, Yeneng Sun*, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhixiang Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)


We introduce a new game form which allows the players' strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players' payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players' strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)523-531
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007
Externally publishedYes


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