Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

Haifeng Fu, Haomiao Yu*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)7-15
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2015


  • Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE)
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Non-atomic games
  • Pareto-undominated equilibrium
  • Saturated probability space
  • Socially-maximal equilibrium


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