Manufacturer-retail platform interactions in the presence of a weak retailer

Yuelin Shen, Xiaodong Yang*, Yue Dai

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)


Motivated by the emergence of dominant retail platforms operating using a store-within-a-store strategy, we study the interaction of such a retailer's decision on the selling format and a manufacturer's decision on the channel selection. The dominant retailer may elect to operate as a traditional reseller or a retail platform where the manufacturer manages his own store and pays a slotting fee and a portion of the revenue to the platform. The manufacturer makes the channel selection decision between the dominant retailer and a weak reseller. A Stackelberg game with the dominant retailer being the leader is formulated, and five relevant channel options are presented. We solve sub-games and characterise the equilibrium solution of the full game. Numerical studies shed light on the roles of the slotting fee and the outcomes of some prevailing selling formats in business practice. In particular, it is shown that the demand substitution between the dominant retailer and the weak retailer is crucial in determining channel selection.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2732-2754
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Production Research
Issue number9
Publication statusPublished - 3 May 2019
Externally publishedYes


  • multichannel retailing
  • platform retailing
  • revenue sharing
  • slotting fee
  • supply chain management


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