Abstract
This paper discusses the role of technological spillovers and technological races in dynamic strategic interactions setup. Two firms invest simultaneously into new products creation and into further development of the quality of these products. Each firm may benefit from the costless technological spillover in case of technological leadership of the other firm. At the same time they cooperate in the joint creation of new products. Three different scenarios emerge: constant technological leadership, the technological leapfrogging and symmetric outcome with or without potential spillovers. R&D is maximal for the first scenario and minimal for the symmetric play under the threat of spillover with endogenous specialization of firms’ activities in cases of constant leadership and leapfrogging. Definition of technological competition intensity as inverse to the technology gap allows to recover inverted-U relationship between those two in a multidimensional context.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 621-653 |
Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | Journal of Evolutionary Economics |
Volume | 26 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Differential games
- Distributed control
- Heterogeneous innovations
- Technological race
- Technology spillovers