Gaming Experiments for Analysis of Pricing Mechanisms at Electricity Markets

V. Chirkin; M. Goldstein; A. Gorbunov; M. Goubko; V. Korepanov; N. Korgin; T. Sayfutdinov; A. Sharova; T. Vaskovskaya

doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2016.12.182

Gaming Experiments for Analysis of Pricing Mechanisms at Electricity Markets

V. Chirkin, M. Goldstein, A. Gorbunov, M. Goubko, V. Korepanov, N. Korgin, T. Sayfutdinov, A. Sharova, T. Vaskovskaya

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A method is proposed to support management policy design and verification in complex cyber-physical & human systems (CPHS). A hierarchy of interconnected formal models is built to provide the multi-faceted view of the conflict situation lying in the core of a certain management problem. Game-theoretical analysis reveals the problem and mechanism design suggests the alternative management policy. Its efficiency is verified by multi-agent simulations and gaming experiments with experts. The approach is illustrated using the examples of two market manipulation issues arising on the Russian wholesale electricity market.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	13-18
Number of pages	6
Journal	IFAC-PapersOnLine
Volume	49
Issue number	32
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2016.12.182
Publication status	Published - 2016
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

business games
congestion management
game theory
locational marginal price
management policy verification
oligopoly

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10.1016/j.ifacol.2016.12.182

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title = "Gaming Experiments for Analysis of Pricing Mechanisms at Electricity Markets",

abstract = "A method is proposed to support management policy design and verification in complex cyber-physical & human systems (CPHS). A hierarchy of interconnected formal models is built to provide the multi-faceted view of the conflict situation lying in the core of a certain management problem. Game-theoretical analysis reveals the problem and mechanism design suggests the alternative management policy. Its efficiency is verified by multi-agent simulations and gaming experiments with experts. The approach is illustrated using the examples of two market manipulation issues arising on the Russian wholesale electricity market.",

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T1 - Gaming Experiments for Analysis of Pricing Mechanisms at Electricity Markets

AU - Chirkin, V.

AU - Goldstein, M.

AU - Gorbunov, A.

AU - Goubko, M.

AU - Korepanov, V.

AU - Korgin, N.

AU - Sayfutdinov, T.

AU - Sharova, A.

AU - Vaskovskaya, T.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - A method is proposed to support management policy design and verification in complex cyber-physical & human systems (CPHS). A hierarchy of interconnected formal models is built to provide the multi-faceted view of the conflict situation lying in the core of a certain management problem. Game-theoretical analysis reveals the problem and mechanism design suggests the alternative management policy. Its efficiency is verified by multi-agent simulations and gaming experiments with experts. The approach is illustrated using the examples of two market manipulation issues arising on the Russian wholesale electricity market.

AB - A method is proposed to support management policy design and verification in complex cyber-physical & human systems (CPHS). A hierarchy of interconnected formal models is built to provide the multi-faceted view of the conflict situation lying in the core of a certain management problem. Game-theoretical analysis reveals the problem and mechanism design suggests the alternative management policy. Its efficiency is verified by multi-agent simulations and gaming experiments with experts. The approach is illustrated using the examples of two market manipulation issues arising on the Russian wholesale electricity market.

KW - business games

KW - congestion management

KW - game theory

KW - locational marginal price

KW - management policy verification

KW - oligopoly

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EP - 18

JO - IFAC-PapersOnLine

JF - IFAC-PapersOnLine

IS - 32

ER -

Gaming Experiments for Analysis of Pricing Mechanisms at Electricity Markets

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Keywords

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