Evolutionary game theory analysis of IPR infringement based on duplicative dynamic

Xue Feng He*, Bing-Zeng, Li Li Jiu

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This thesis mainly analyses the strategies'choice on the interaction between the administrant government group and the intellectual property right (IPR) users group with the evolutionary game theory. A model of asymmetric game is set up by analyzing their respective costs and benefits, replicated dynamic model and differential equation stability theory are adopted as basic analytical tools. At the same time, the steady state of the monitoring infringement activity according to different values of parameters under bounded rationality is analysed. Simultaneously, how IPR users and supervisory administrations choose their respective strategies are explained and some policies and strategies about the establishment of a complete supervision and regulation system concerning IPR infringement are put forward.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1425-1430
Number of pages6
JournalBioTechnology: An Indian Journal
Issue number10
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes


  • Duplicative dynamic
  • Evolutionary game
  • Infringement
  • Intellectual property right (IPR)


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