Local and Regional Governance in China

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Locality and region are unavoidable territorial units in economic geography research. There is, however, no single or universal definition for either of them. Dunford (2009) suggests three approaches to defining regions: homogeneity, functional interdependency, and administrative territories, with scales and meanings varying significantly from different perspectives. Administrative regions can range from supranational, national, and subnational entities that can be subdivided into local government districts and/or social service districts. In contrast, a homogeneous region may be smaller than a local government district. Localities were traditionally defined by static features such as topography, which create separateness through natural barriers such as hills or rivers but can also been seen in human geography as focusing of local flows and interactions, where a localized complex of flows and characteristics merges into more distinctive clusters in adjacent areas (Coombes 2000). Localities are often denoted as political and administrative territories for discharging and providing public services and statistical units (Jones and Woods 2013). Localities and regions are not simply the basic geographical units into which space is divided, but are socially constructed spatial concepts that are integrally constituted by economic, social, ecological, political, and cultural relations and processes, which, in turn, profoundly influence local and regional development (Pike, Rodriguez-Pose, and Tomaney 2007). Although the terms "local" and "regional" are often used together in academic publications, they are not the same and are sometimes involved in contestation (Turok 2009). The term governance, again, does not have a settled definition, although, at the national and subnational levels, it is often understood as a new term used in public administration to refer to the effective implementation of state policy or regulation of social behavior through networks, participation, and other nonhierarchical mechanisms (Fukuyama 2016). Despite the multifaceted and nonuniform definitions of these terms, local and regional governance has become increasingly salient for local and regional development to cope with globalization and decentralization since the 1970s. Local and regional governance in China is discussed here mainly from the administrative perspective.

The meaning of local and regional in the Chinese context

While the definitions of localities and regions in China are also varied, they are relative notions with no particular territorial context in both policy and academic language. Localities are normally referred to as administrative units, which, in the context of a multilevel government system (only applicable in mainland China), may refer to four significantly distinctive geographical scales: a provincial territory (including autonomous municipal cities and regions) in the language of the central government; a prefectural territory seen by the provincial government, or counties or county-level cities under the jurisdiction of a

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prefectural government; a township (*Zhen*) and borough (*Xiang*) and administrative village within a county, county-level city, or urban district. The administrative regions of China once also included an administrative layer sitting between national and provincial levels, known as Great Administrative Regions (GAR), equipped with military, Party, and governmental departments, although this level was short-lived existing only from 1949 to 1954. The primary purpose of GARs was to consolidate and strengthen central regulation in the period immediately after the formation of the communist government. In 1958 Economic Cooperative Regions (ECR) were introduced, but with a limited function of coordinating regional economic planning under central guidance. Regional demarcation and institutional reshuffling of ECRs occurred almost every 5–10 years during the rest of the centrally planned economy period (Y. Li and Wu 2012). At the subprovincial level, regions were known as prefectures, with an administrative office acting as an agency of the provincial government to manage counties that were predominantly rural areas, albeit the headquarters was usually located in the central city of the region, which was governed by the municipal government. The two parallel governing bodies were merged to become what is now known as the prefectural-level city in the administrative division reform started in 1983 (Chung 2007).

After economic reform in 1978, the ECR as the institutional instrument for redistributive regional policy was largely abandoned. Instead, responsibility for economic development was delegated to local governments, marking a change to uneven development strategy. This process is known as decentralization and regionalization in the literature. Regional policy was shifted to take advantages of local geographical potentials and local subjective initiatives (local self-sufficiency), supported by the so-called open-door strategy. In contrast to the supraprovincial regions used as a redistributive institution in the period of centrally planned economy, the territorial delimitation of regions in the post-reform era can range from the supraprovincial level to subprefectural levels, often without corresponding formal institutions. Apart from the direct designation in the 1980s of the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen and 14 cities along the eastern coast open for foreign direct investment (FDI) and autonomy in relation to international trade matters that included preferential policies (Fan 1995), the implementation of subsequent regional policies, such as establishment of Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs), High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (HTIDZs), National University Science Parks, Pilot Free Trade Zones, and Bonded Zones were all open for local competition.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, supraprovincial regions were brought back to the policy agenda to tackle growing regional disparities. Three regional programs were launched in succession, namely Western Region Development strategy (1999), Revitalization of the Old Northeast Industrial Bases strategy (2003), and Uplifting Central China strategy (*zhong bu jue qi*) (2004). Each program offered a tailored package of preferential policies and support. As the names of the three programs show, a new regional division of the country was established to define the area of application of the new regional policies. These programs, however, were not coordinated by dedicated institutions but required the provinces involved to compete for support and investment through the submission of project proposals under the relevant program. Numerous infrastructural and industrial projects were built promptly without a coordinated plan, resulting in socioeconomic

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and eco-environmental problems (Jia *et al.* 2020; W. Li, Liu, and Yang 2012). A few years later, in the eleventh Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (FYDP) (2006–2010), the concept of Main Functional Zones (MFZs) was introduced by which the entire national territory was classified into four types of regions: Area for Optimizing Development (AfOD), Area for Prioritizing Development (AfPD), Area for Constraining Development (AfCD), and Area for Forbidden Development (AfFD) (China State Council 2005). This classification was designed to recentralize control over development and incorporate sustainable development elements into regional development policy, with corresponding policies relating to investment, industrial development, migration, land use, fiscal and transfer payments, and local performance evaluation (Y. Li and Wu 2012). The MFZs, however, were designated through four levels of government from central to county level following a top-down approach. Without changing the status of gross domestic product (GDP) growth as the decisive indicator of local performance, and also of local policymakers' personal career development, designation of AfCDs and AfFDs was found to be difficult, particularly in lagging localities in the central and western regions due to the way that environmental protection restricts economic development.

The MFZ regions have nevertheless given priority to a new type of region known as city clusters (*Cheng-shi-qun*) from the twelfth FYDP onward. The notion of city cluster was initially drawn from Jean Gottman's (1957) concept of megalopolis. However, it was abused as soon as local policymakers perceived that there was a chance to avoid restrictions in the designated AfCDs and/or AfFDs. There are several English translations of city cluster by Chinese authors, including urban cluster, urban agglomeration, and megalopolis. Each concept represents different interpretations of the reality in places; for example, the socioeconomic and spatial patterns in the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta may be closer to the original meaning of megalopolis coined by Gottman than others, which are largely planning initiatives that facilitate urban sprawl. Indeed, besides the two above-mentioned city regions, 19 other city clusters were listed in the twelfth FYDP, most of which were provincial capitals combined with a number of surrounding prefectural level cities. The geographical scales of city clusters were expanded later on by merging some small clusters. For example, the city cluster of the Middle Reaches of the Yangtze River is a combination of three city clusters planned previously, including the city cluster of Wuhan plus eight cities in Hubei Province, the Changsha–Zhuzhou–Xiangtan city cluster in Hunan Province, and Poyang Lake Rim city cluster in Jiangxi Province. This combined cluster expanded the scale to contain as many as 31 prefectural level cities, covering 326 100 km^2. As in the case of the division of the less developed parts of China into the Western, Northeastern and Central areas, the city cluster remains a concept for regional planning with specified development policy but without corresponding institutions. Very recently, metropolitan areas, that are much smaller than nationally defined city clusters, have emerged in a new round of regional demarcation and planning focus.

Hierarchical governance system and multilevel governance

Multilevel governance is common across countries in the world. In most cases, the functional division between central, regional, and local governments is defined by law or by regulations. In China, however, every unit of government,

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

Figure 1 Outline of China's administrative structure. Numbers in parentheses are the number of administrative units in 2021; Chongqing was promoted to provincial level in1997, thereby reducing vice provincial level cities to 15. (Adapted from the NBSC China Statistical Yearbook 2022.)

including provincial, prefectural, and county levels, are fully equipped with the same functional institutions as the central government, with independent public finance, making it a de facto local state. The system works like a set of Russian dolls, except that one upper-level unit of government contains a number of immediately lower-level units. As Figure 1, which illustrates the structural relationships among the units of government, shows, only the immediate upper and lower levels of government officially have direct channels of communications, with no horizontal institutional relationships between units at the same administrative level. Administrative hierarchy is argued to be the fundamental element to understanding the Chinese governance system in general and local and regional governance in particular. Places are classified by their administrative level. Every place is assigned to a certain level in the administrative hierarchy, which applies only to the locality where the respective government headquarters sits rather than the territory under its jurisdiction. For example, the territory of a prefectural-level city comprises urban districts and counties and/or county-level cities, but only the core areas of urban districts (excluding rural areas within the urban districts) enjoy the benefits available for the prefectural-level place. In this situation, each level of government performs two roles: the pursuit of local development in the place of the government headquarters and the coordination

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of territorial development of the place under jurisdiction, which are frequently in conflict with one another. In fact, prefectural-level city governments are often accused of sacrificing the interests of subordinated counties and/or county-level cities while pursuing their own interests (Zhang and Wu 2006). Given the top-down decision-making power and resource allocation, which are always based on administrative level rather than actual demand, places assigned to the upper positions of the hierarchy are always privileged and enjoy more resources and better services than those at the lower administrative levels. Furthermore, it is worth noting that prefectures, districts, and street offices are not fully functional government units but agencies of the provinces, cities, and counties to which they are subordinated. The differences are that the former does not have planning power and independent public finance.

Further down the hierarchy, township-level governments that exist as townships (*Zhen*) and boroughs (*Xiang*) are not fully equipped with functional institutions, nor funded by public finance. Instead, these entities are treated institutionally as informal collective organizations that should be self-sustaining by drawing on extra-budgetary means such as collecting fees or charges from villages and town and village enterprises under their jurisdiction; until their financial independence was halted in 2006 (marking it a new initiative of centralization at the very local level). The informality of township-level government has a history that can be traced back to 1958 when the people's communes were formed and made one of the three shareholders in rural land (the other two being the administrative village and natural village in the name of production team, the genuine holder of rural land). The fundamental role played by the then communes and township-level governments before 2006 was that of an agency that sent downwards the annual plan or demands for agricultural production and collected the state share of output in addition to collecting and paying agricultural tax and obtaining extra-budgetary income to finance its own operational needs.

At the very bottom level of the governance system are administrative villages in rural areas and neighborhood committees in urban areas. Both are constituted as informal self-regulated grassroots organizations, although neighborhood committees are fully funded by public finance. It is at this level that rural and urban areas can be accurately identified in terms of both land use and household registration (Hukou) characteristics. Whereas neighborhood committees are merely the agency of the Street Office, the administrative village committee is by law an autonomous managerial body elected by villagers to manage village affairs with no public funding from the state. According to the Constitution, rural land is collectively owned by all villagers, but it can be used only for agricultural and forestry production, villagers' residential plots, and minimal collective development activities such as the provision of social infrastructure. For any other purposes, the land has to be transferred to the state (become state-owned land) at a price that provides compensation equal to the value of lost agricultural production of 3–5 years. Very recently, administrative village's responsibilities to provide compulsory education, health services, and collect agricultural products and extra-budget fees were removed thanks to the New Socialist Countryside and Rural Revitalization programs, which directed public spending towards rural areas. Meanwhile, a few years ago village finance was taken over by township-level governments after their finances were handed over to county-level governments.

The literature on local and regional governance tends to describe the dynamic vertical

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relationships between upper and lower levels of government in terms of centralization and decentralization (see Tang (2021) for details). While these accounts brought the Chinese practice into the international debate about this subject, the actual situation is much more complex than any statement about centralization at one point in time and decentralization at another indicates. Indeed, these two trends co-exist in China as a means for delegating burdensome responsibilities while centralizing resource allocation power and personnel control to ensure national policy compliance and local cadres' political loyalty (Lee and Zhang 2013). In the hierarchical local state system, decentralization from the central government is often associated with hierarchical centralization – centralization exercised by different levels of local government. The most burdensome responsibilities, however, are decentralized down to the lowest level of government without corresponding resources (Gao 2010).

The centralization and decentralization undertaken in China also involved jurisdictional reform. Two typical examples of this practice are the following. The first was the designation in 1985 of 16 vice-provincial-level cities by the central government (Figure 1), initially as cities with separate development plans from their respective provinces. The 16 cities include 10 provincial capitals (Guangzhou in Guangdong Province, Wuhan in Hubei Province, Shenyang in Liaoning Province, Harbin in Heilongjiang Province, Changchun in Jilin Province, Xi'an in Shaanxi Province, Jinan in Shandong Province, Nanjing in Jiangsu Province, Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province, and Chengdu in Sichuan Province) and six non-provincial capital cities, which are either national industrial bases or key to national development strategies (Dalian in Shenyang Province, Qingdao in Shandong Province, Ningbo in Zhejiang Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, and Chongqing – formerly in Sichuan Province but elevated to provincial-level by the central government in 1997 when it joined Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin to become the fourth city under the direct jurisdiction of the central government). This step placed the listed cities under the dual control of the central and provincial governments, and can be seen as a measure that countered the economic decentralization that occurred after the economic reform, which allowed for incentives for local governments to foster economic growth in their respective jurisdictions but weakened central government's authority and power. As the 16 cities were either the most industrialized or strategically important, the designation of the vice-provincial cities allowed the central government to take back partial control of economic development and personnel appointments and, in turn, fiscal revenue.

The second is the administrative annexation process by which some prefectural-level cities turned county or county-level cities into urban districts after the city-leading counties reform in 1983. In doing so, the prefectural-level cities not only expanded their land areas for urban development but also gained fiscal control by eliminating the planning power and independent public finance of the counties or county-level cities annexed. This annexation maneuver is nevertheless often contested by the county or county-level city in question as their burdensome responsibilities remain, even as they lose decision-making powers and fiscal autonomy. For local residents, restriction of their entitlement to social services and cross-district movement was not removed. Furthermore, counties and county-level cities under the jurisdiction of prefectural-level cities always found that their interests and development opportunities were sacrificed in favor of the

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prefectural-level city proper (Zhang and Wu 2006). Partially in order to correct these bad incentives, as well as to gain control of local development activities so as to increase their share of fiscal revenue, some provincial governments started to place counties and county-level cities that prefectural-level cities can potentially annex under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government (as shown in Figure 1), although this measure also appeared to amount to cherry-picking. Notwithstanding this intervention, administrative annexation eventually leads to metropolitanization.

Entrepreneurial local state and territorial competition

The nature of nested local states within a top-down resource allocation system made local governments "hostile brothers" (Peck and Tickell 1995) who compete for everything (e.g., preferential policies, decision making power, investment, resources, etc.) that may benefit their territory whilst transferring burdensome responsibilities. This competition is further incentivized by the reliance on GDP growth as the dominant indicator of local performance. Local governments always try to set up policies and barriers to confine the positive spillovers of economic activities within their administrative boundaries in order to outperform their rivals. In such a governance system, while the upper-level governments attempt to control subordinated governments by frequently changing and releasing policy incentives, horizontal coordination among different administrative units is, if not impossible, scarcely ever found to exist. Typical examples of territorial competition can be found in the hype surrounding industrial and high-tech parks in the 1990s (Hu 2007) and new town development competition in the 2000s (Han *et al.* 2021), where almost every administrative unit including township level institutions established at least one industrial park or new urban district to seize the opportunity of converting more arable land into development use. Meanwhile, local governments frequently adopt various forms of local protection and establish cross-boundary trade barriers. In some cities, even like Shanghai in the 2000s, for example, the municipal government asked taxi operation companies to use locally produced cars and would not give permission for the use of cars produced in other cities. Recently, many cities have tried to develop localized supply chains without reference to whether there were suppliers in neighboring localities. In a sense, where the economic activities are entangled with the fragmented local state system, aggregate national economic development indicators may be inflated as a result of overreporting by subnational entities (Jia et al. 2020).

Entrepreneurial local states not only compete with their counterparts at the same level for external resources but also compete with their subordinate entities. As mentioned in the previous section, the 1999 Western Region Development program, the 2003 Revitalizing North-Eastern Old Industrial Bases program, and the 2004 Uplifting Central China program each came with a package of preferential policies. Most projects and investment under these policies eventually went, however, to urban areas in the respective provincial capitals or regional cities.

In contrast to engendering competitive relationships, recently introduced regional development plans adopted as key policy instruments for integrated and coordinated regional development appeared unwelcome. For instance, the National Development and Reform Commission of China (NDRC) published a Yangtze River Delta City-Cluster Development Plan

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in 2016 (NDRC CC Plan). This plan covered 26 prefectural level and above cities (217 000 km^2) in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui provinces. The NDRC CC Plan required the four provincial governments and 25 cities to improve cross-boundary connections, share social service and innovation resources, promote a regional single market, and coordinate environment and industrial policies. After 3 years little progress had been made because the NDRC CC Plan offered fewer immediate apparent benefits but more commitments. In 2019, the State Council of China promulgated the Yangtze River Delta Integrative Development Plan (CSC ID Plan), which added Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province to the NDRC CC Plan, expanding the plan area to cover 225 000 km^2. Although the plan conveyed an even stronger vision of commitment from listed cities, not much meaningful coordination and cooperation have occurred. Perhaps envisaging local resistance, the CSC ID Plan provided for a much smaller eco-green integrative development demonstration zone (covering about 2300 km^2) on the borders of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces. The local implementation plan that was published more than 3 years later in March 2023, however, confined the demonstration zone to an area of only 659.5 km^2 that contained only five townships instead of 27 as specified in the CSC ID Plan, making it effectively of negligible significance.

SEE ALSO: Developmentalism; Governance and development; Governmentality; Local state; Political economy and regional development; Regional definition and classification; Regional development models; Regional development policies; Regional economic integration; Regionalism

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