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Rethinking Managerial Control in the Contemporary Context

Jean-Yves LeCorre and Thierry Burger-Helmchen

"The goal of management control systems is to implement organizational strategies. Organizations that are able to efficiently meet their strategic objectives are the best performers in the long run."

Robert Newton Anthony

Summary

Classical managerial control theories mostly focus on performance indicators, 17 like the number of pieces produced. More recent theories focus on behavior 18 control. All theories are specialized in controlling a specific unit of the firm, i.e., 19 the employee, the team, or a subsystem. Therefore, agency theory-based control 20 and system-based control have their limits. In this chapter, we advocate for a 21 more holistic approach that takes into account the culture of the firm but also of 22 the geographic region studied. Indigenous research is presented as a possible way to improve managerial control and harmonize western and eastern 24 countries' views on managerial control (we take several examples from North 25 America, Europe, and China). We also propose a general guideline for 26 conducting indigenous research on managerial control. Finally, we raise some 27 concerns about the risk of using control to spread specific ideologies in firms that 28

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
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$\frac{36}{37}$ Introduction 1

Managerial control theories can be traced back to the first writers of management. 38 In one of the first textbooks about management, Fayol listed control and planning, 39 organization, staffing, and leadership as one of the manager's functions [1]. Today, 40 the focus on organizational control has become a large part of management science 41 and economics, commonly used in the subfields of finance, accounting, manage-42 ment information systems, organizational theory, and, more recently, innovation 43 and creativity management [2]. 44

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In modern theories of the firm, managerial control is defined as the main 45 mechanism for strategic implementation. It is also a way to exercise management 46 power and organizational, political influence. More recently, managerial control 47 started to include cultural and philosophical perspectives, building a riverbed for 48 ideological approaches. 49

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This chapter addresses those issues in the following sections. The first part highlights some of the standard theories of managerial control and their links with classical theories of the firms. The second part investigates some cultural, philosophical, and ideological approaches of managerial control. The last part of the chapter calls for the development of indigenous research in managerial control to overcome limitations to the actual global, standardized view. 55

56 57 **Classical Theories of the Firm and Managerial Control** 2

In her famous book on organization theory, Hatch introduces control by quoting 58 Tannenbaum [3, 4]. This author highlighted that classical theories of the firm often 59 base their control view on much older works. Thereby theories of the firm authors 60 show limited attention given to controlling (for most of them). 61

"Organization implies control. A social organization is an ordered arrangement of indi-62 vidual human interactions. Control processes help circumscribe idiosyncratic behaviours 63 and keep them conformant to the rational plan of the organization. Organizations require a 64 certain amount of conformity as well as the integration of diverse activities. It is the 65 function of control to bring about conformance to organizational requirements and 66 achievement of the ultimate purposes of the organization. The coordination and order 67 created out of the diverse interests and potentially diffuse behaviours of members is largely 68 a function of control." 69

Tannenbaum, 1968: 3 70

Theories of the firm incorporated managerial control based on the assumption 71 that different individuals have different reasons for participating in organizations. 72 Therefore, firms face the problem of ensuring conflicts of interest, personal agen-73 das, and self-interest. Since the organization is composed of individuals with dif-74 ferent interests, the manager must exercise control. Managerial control theory 75 focuses on mechanisms for controlling behaviors to ensure that self-interest is 76 minimized. 77

This part of the chapter will introduce three control theories of organizations 78 linked to three theories of the firm. Control concepts can be applied at the indi-79 vidual, unit, or organizational level, and are often applied to all three levels. More 80 recent theories take a "big-picture approach" when older theories are more focused 81 on a specific level. 82

The first theory presented involves performance evaluation and feedback. This 83 method shares many characteristics with the description of the firm as a complex 84 system [5]. The second theory, called agency theory, is rooted in economics and 85 accounting [6]. This theory of the firm focuses on controlling based on contracts 86 designed to govern employees to serve organizational owners (such as sharehold-87 ers) rather than their own interests. The third type of theories compares the market 88 and bureaucracy, groups, and clans as alternative forms of organizational control, 89 and raises the issue of using culture as a control mechanism. 90

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2.1 A System-Level Approach to Control

In this approach, the firm is depicted as a set of subsystems. The current state of each system is compared to the desired state, and any differences between the two will trigger adjustments. Organizational control processes aim to identify the difference between the current level and the expected level and trigger adjustments when a difference is found. In this approach of the firm, organizational control processes are a part of the strategy implementation.

The environment provides contextual elements that impact the development and 98 execution of the strategy globally at the firm level and each strategy for respectively 99 each subsystem. Strategy-related goals are run through the entire hierarchy until 100 each organization member understands its role in the overall strategic plan. Then, 101 individual-level goals defined in the context of unit and organization-level goals 102 begin as activities that will cause the organization to achieve the desired output, of 103 course, provided that the strategy and goals have been fully considered and clearly 104 communicated. 105

Strategies and goals are only used to direct the organization in a specific 106 direction. Actions that occur throughout the organization will implement and realize 107 the strategy. Therefore, strategists rely on members of other organizations to act in 108 ways that produce strategic goals (rather than pursue their own interests). To ensure 109 that these actions take place, management personnel have established a control 110 system to monitor and adjust the process of implementing the strategy. In this view, 111 the control system is consistent with the organizational target system, supporting 112 and encouraging individuals and units to develop in the direction of strategic 113 definition. 114

The challenge for the managers of each subsystem is to focus the attention of the 115 employees and to make clear links between goals and actions. This is particularly 116 difficult in an unstable environment, known as the "VUCA" context where each 117 subsystem can react differently due to high volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and 118 ambiguity [7]. Setting goals or standards of acceptable behavior related to goals is 119 the first step in developing control systems in such situations. The next step is for 120 measuring and monitoring compliance with goals and standards and providing 121 feedback. The feedback is based on the comparison between the actual performance 122 and the standard set and is communicated to trigger adjustment when a deviation 123 occurs. This requires two things. First, it depends on an understanding of the 124 technology used by those constrained by the control system. Second, the organi-125 zational goals must be specific to the task to be controlled. If these two conditions 126 are not met, the definition of task control will be unclear, the control system will be 127 hindered by ambiguity, and employees and managers will lack a clear focus [8]. 128 Once the goals and tasks are defined in the whole system level, goals or standards 129 can be set to encourage activities to achieve the goals for each subsystem. Two 130 methods can be used for this: control outputs and/or behavior control. 131

Output control focuses on the results of task activities and depends on the measurement of these results. Output control can be developed at the individual or subsystem level. It is a simple piece counting system. In such a piece-rate system,

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employees are paid for the number of products they produce in a given time. Of 135 course, depending on the firm's aim, or the sector of activity, such counting 136 measures need to be adapted, but the overall logic remains the same. Quality can 137 also be the focus of output control. Calculating the number of defects for a single 138 product will be an example of a single level output metric focused on quality. When 139 applied to a subsystem, the output is defined as the collective result of the work of 140 the set of individuals, for example, the number of products assembled by all 141 members of the subsystem. 142

When it is not easy to measure output at any level or in any subsystem, for 143 example, in teaching (output is new learning) or customer service (output is cus-144 tomer satisfaction), behavioral control can often be used. Behavioral control 145 depends on knowing which behaviors will produce the required level of perfor-146 mance. An example is the use of behavioral indicators (such as proven knowledge 147 or enthusiasm for the subject) to evaluate teaching. When such indicators are 148 known, behavior control can be performed. However, when it comes to teaching, 149 output measures and behavior measures have their own limits [9, 10]. 150

There are many problems that frustrate the design and implementation of per-151 formance evaluation systems, among which the most important is ambiguity. 152 Ambiguity makes certain organizational activities extremely difficult to measure 153 behavior or output metrics. Creativity and innovation are examples. As we all 154 know, the output here is difficult to measure because it takes a long time to identify 155 ideas, innovative solutions, or designs [11]. Behavior is also difficult to identify 156 because the definition of appropriate behavior changes with each new customer, 157 product, problem, or situation. However, years of research have made some pro-158 gress in controlling creativity and innovation, and its emergence is generally 159 regarded as an inspirational problem [12]. 160

In situations where it is difficult to define the output being ambiguous about 161 appropriate behavior, uncertainty may cause managers to use the control system 162 inappropriately. That is, the uncertainty that cannot control output or behavior can 163 ironically lead to stronger expectations for these controls [13]. For example, in an 164 R&D laboratory, everyone generally admits that the time spent in the laboratory is 165 not more important than the lack of observable inspiration or creativity. However, 166 time in the laboratory can be used to evaluate performance, as this is the only 167 objective indicator available [14]. The result of this approach is an overemphasis on 168 what really matters. By emphasizing all aspects of work behavior, the control 169 system can control all aspects of work behavior, and the control system may impair 170 the required performance [15]. 171

Another problem with performance evaluation systems is that they are prone to negative reactions among people under control. For example, there is an intention to find a way to meet the needs of the system. The control subject can achieve this goal by focusing only on the measured content and ignoring the underlying goals of the system. No set of measures can capture all aspects of strategy and goals equally well. If measures become the focus of activities, other aspects of performance will also be affected [16].

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Unit-level control usually depends on converting unit goals into financial goals 179 like budgets [17, 18]. It determines the number of resources that the unit will use to 180 carry out its work. The budget allows managers to know what resources will be 181 available to achieve the set goals in a given period and to monitor the performance 182 of the budget period by comparing actual costs with budget costs. In many orga-183 nizations, statistical reports tailored to the performance of a particular unit are used 184 to provide feedback on this information to the unit, which then makes 185 self-adjustment. The report focuses on information such as output, quality control 186 data, and other unit-level results. 187

188 2.2 Control in Agency Theory

In agency theory, the organization's control issues are viewed from the perspective of the organization owner (investor) and external stakeholders (such as underwriters, creditors, and potential investors). The relationship between the owner (called the principal) and the manager (called the agent) is the core issue of the theory [19].

Managers are called agents to indicate that they should act for the client's 194 interests when acting on behalf of the client, not for their own benefit. The agency 195 problem involves the risk that the agency will serve its own interests rather than 196 those of the principal. Agency theory focuses on the way of controlling the 197 self-service behavior of the agency to ensure the protection of the principal's 198 interests. Although agency theorists explain agency problems based on the rela-199 tionship between company owners and managers who hire them to act on their 200 behalf, the theory can be generalized to the relationship between lower-level 201 management and its subordinates [9]. 202

In agency theory, the issue of the divergence of interests is resolved through the 203 conclusion of a contract, so that the agent's own interests are consistent with those 204 of the principal. The contract stipulates measures and promises rewards so that 205 agents will serve their own interests when meeting contract requirements. This is 206 done by providing rewards that the agent considers desirable, and building these 207 rewards based on activities that serve the interests of the principal. Therefore, the 208 issue of the divergence of interests between the principal and the agent is dealt 209 through a contract, and the principal delegates the work to their agent through the 210 contract at the agreed price [20]. The principal and the agent sign the contract to act 211 on their behalf because they cannot or do not want to be present all the time to 212 protect their own interests. However, because no one was present, the agents who 213 were unwilling to perform their duties in a completely responsible manner were 214 willing to accept opportunism. In other words, the agency theory assumes that it is 215 not always possible to rely on the agent to fulfill the agreement. They may avoid 216 performing duties, work, and responsibilities. In agency theory, this dilemma is 217 explained based on information [21]. 218

The ability of the principal to know whether his agent is evading depends on the information available to the principal. A situation of complete information indicates

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that the principal knows whether their agent is right. When possible, direct observation can provide complete information, but it takes much time, so that the client may wish to operate the organization personally. Also, because management involves many unobservable aspects, direct observation may not be possible. Incomplete information means that agents may or may not be caught, so they will face the temptation to minimize efforts [22].

From the perspective of agency theory, the question of whether to choose 227 behavior or result control is a cost issue related to collecting the required infor-228 mation. This information needs to minimize the agent's chance of evasion. 229 Behavioral control requires the use of additional management to perform such 230 activities, or the development of information systems (such as cost accounting, 231 budgeting, and formal reporting). Without conventional technology, management 232 and information systems will be more difficult to develop and more expensive to 233 use [23]. 234

As behavioral control becomes less feasible, output control becomes more 235 attractive. When it is easy to measure the output (for example, the number of 236 shipments), the cost of output control is the lowest, but if it is difficult to measure 237 the output (for example, morale and quality are as important as the production 238 quantity), the attractiveness of the output control will be reduced. When an orga-239 nization faces an uncertain future, output also becomes problematic. In other words, 240 agents only partially determine the results of their organization, technology, and 241 environment, and are also partially responsible. Because the control of results keeps 242 agents accountable for unforeseen circumstances, results measurement forces them 243 to assume some related risks. 244

Several authors suggest that organizations can adopt multiple control strategies [2, 24]:

- The first is to design a simple routine job so that behavior can be easily observed and rewarded;
- The second control strategy is to design a more complex and interesting job and invest in information systems (such as budget systems, audits, or other management) to gain knowledge about behaviors and reward them based on those specific actions;
- The third option is to design more complicated and interesting work, but use simpler evaluation schemes (for example, profitability or income) and reward based on the evaluation results. In this strategy, risk rewards replace measures and precise job design; and
- The fourth option no longer emphasizes performance evaluation but is based on more holistic indicators. This is the idea of selection, training, and socialization as an alternative to agency-based control systems. Organization theorist, William Ouchi, described this idea.

The following section turns to this approach, championed by Ouchi, where economic and financial indicators become less important, and other forms of control emerge.

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264 **2.3** Controls with Markets, Groups, and Bureaucracies

For Ouchi [25], the problem of control can be expressed as "*the problem of achieving cooperation between individuals who have some different goals.*" He pointed out three different sources of control in an organization to solve this problem: markets, bureaucracies, and clans (or groups). Table 1 summarizes his views.

Market control is carried out through the competition. When an organization participates in the free market, prices and profits can be used to evaluate and control its performance. In competition, price is regarded as an indicator of economic performance because it is assumed that the comparison of price and profit between a group of competitors in a free market can assess their relative efficiency.

For example, those organizations with the lowest cost can afford the lowest 275 price, so they can compete most effectively. Similarly, organizations that consis-276 tently provide products or services of higher value (e.g., higher quality and more 277 practicality) than their competitors may charge additional fees. Both of these 278 conditions contribute to the organization's income. In either case, the performance 279 of the organization will be reflected in the prices that its products or services receive 280 on the market, which, in turn, will affect its revenue and profits. In this way, the 281 market controls the organization because low profits force the organization to 282 improve or suffer consequences [26]. 283

By establishing a profit center, market control can also be used at the unit level, 284 within a department of a multi-sector organization. This form of market control 285 simulates the market within the organization by allowing units to conduct economic 286 transactions. For example, this situation occurs when one department sells its 287 products to another department. In this internal market, transfer prices allow the 288 accounting system to calculate unit profits in the same way as the entire organi-289 zation. This is noted in some cases by allowing the department to purchase inputs 290 from external suppliers at prices where internal prices are not competitive, or to sell 291 products to external customers when these customers offer better prices than 292 internal customers, and so competition rules come into play [27]. When depart-293 ments in an organization operate as profit centers, senior management can compare 294 the performance of each department like shareholders. Then, top management 295 attempts to invest in its various departments to maximize the return of the total 296 portfolio of the business operated by the organization. In this way, organizations 297 can use the market to control their departments, which are competing for the highest 298 level of profits [28]. 299

Market control strategies are effective only when an organization or unit pro-300 duces products or services that can be defined and priced. Competition makes the 301 price meaningful. Without competition, the price cannot indicate internal efficiency 302 because it cannot be compared with other firms or units [29]. If there is no com-303 petition and there is no market, prices will usually expand as in other monopoly 304 situations. When neither there is a competition, nor it is possible to simulate 305 competition effectively, another control mechanism must be found. When markets 306 fail, organizations often turn to bureaucracy. 307



20 Rethinking Managerial Control in the Contemporary Context

Table 1 Principal characteristics of control by markets, bureaucracies or clans [3, 25]

rol	inτ	ne Co	ntemp	orary	Context
	Focus	Results	Actions	Values/attitudes	
	Examples	Output schedules/budgets	Auditing/direct supervision	Training/indoctrination/certification	
clans [5, 22]	Forms	Output control	Behavioral control	Ceremonial or symbolic control	
y markets, bureaucracies or	Assumptions	Competition/economic exchange	Legitimate authority/hierarchy	Established tradition/trust	
able Principal characteristics of control by markets, pureaucractes of clans [3, 23]	Mechanism	Price/profit	Rules/surveillances	Commitment/socialization	
	Source	Market	Bureaucracy	Clan	

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J.-Y. LeCorre and T. Burger-Helmchen Bureaucracy relies on a combination of rules, procedures, documentation, and surveillance to achieve control [30]. The focus of the bureaucracy is the standardization of behavior. Bureaucracy is not a unit that rewards in response to

310 market forces, but rewards individuals for observing established rules and regula-311 tions. Bureaucracy depends on the existence of a legal authority level for managing 312 bureaucracy. In the bureaucratic control system, the basic control mechanism 313 involves the close supervision and guidance of subordinates to their superiors. 314 Rules usually describe the process to be completed or the output and quality 315 standards to be achieved [31]. Supervisors and managers assess the degree of 316 compliance with rules and procedures. The difference between the rules and the 317 pricing mechanism of the market control system is that prices involve comparing 318 the value of the output generated by individual buyers or sellers, while rules are 319 more or less arbitrary standards [32]. 320

The pricing mechanism does not require intervention, and according to the rules, 321 managers must set standards, observe performance, and evaluate it to determine 322 whether performance is satisfactory. This management function is expensive. 323 Therefore, market control is more effective than bureaucratic control. However, 324 because many organizations cannot meet price conditions, bureaucracy provides an 325 important and widely used alternative. Similarly, when it is difficult to monitor due 326 to limited knowledge of the behavior that produces output, the form of controlled 327 behavior is not applicable [33]. If the results are difficult to identify or appear 328 infrequently, the output control will also be invalid. In this case, rational means of 329 control through the market or bureaucracy will not succeed, and organizations must 330 rely on their social system to limit the dispersion of goals and chaos. In that 331 situation, a clan approach may be the solution (Table 2). 332

Cultural values, norms, and expectations provide the main control mechanism 333 for organizations that use clan control. Such a system requires socialization. Once 334 employees have socialized, they have internal control because they are committed 335 to the organization's goals and practices [34]. 336

Clan control depends on an implicit understanding of the values and beliefs that 337 guide the behavior of its members. This internal understanding helps guide and 338 coordinate the activities of the organization. The organization's norms and values 339 define the limits of appropriate behavior, and there are reasons to sanction any 340 behavior that is not suitable in the system. For those members who often have to 341 sacrifice some or all of their own interests to become members of the clan society, 342 this also represents a high degree of commitment to the system [35]. 343

Perfect Imperfect	
	rt
Ability to measure outputs High Behavior or outcome control Outcome	e control
Low Behavior control Clan con	ntrol

	Table 2 W	nen to measure	e behavior when to	o measure outcome	s [3, 25]
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Organizations with a large number of professionals are especially a model of 344 clan control because professionals are highly socialized about their professional 345 norms and expectations, and their professional commitment and attention to pro-346 fessional reputation help control their behavior. However, professional commitment 347 may run counter to the interests of the organization, and when doing so, most 348 professionals will give up the interests of the organization to be loval to their 349 professional interests [36]. Once this is done, the personal value will guide em-350 ployees to do as expected and desired by the organization without the costs asso-351 ciated with bureaucratic control mechanisms, so monitoring will largely be 352 unnecessary. However, the potentially harmful effects of such control strategies, 353 such as increasing the potential for collective thinking (i.e., unable to challenge 354 each other's ideas and eventually embarked on an unstable path) and limited 355 innovation, need to be considered [37]. 356

All organizations will have social and information systems, but their degree of dependence and development on these systems will vary with the type of control system they prefer to implement. Using organizational culture becomes a strong control system when clans or groups have aligned the interests. The culture of the firm becomes a control mechanism pushing sometimes much more than simple work control. In those situations, some firms may be vectors of ideology with the help of their control mechanism.

365 3 International Settings, Ideologies, and Control

Several authors proposed the clan control hypothesis because culture influences
 behavior through norms, values, expectations, and beliefs. Managers can control
 behavior by controlling these aspects of culture [38]. We can identify two groups:
 those who do not believe that culture can be controlled and those who believe
 managers can effectively control culture.

3.1 Managers Cannot Reinforce Control with Organizational 372 Culture

Cultural conceptualization often describes the organization as a homogenous entity. 373 When this kind of homogeneity is observed, it is often found at the top management 374 level. After many promotions, the managers who fully support the firm's business 375 tend to be part of the culture. Therefore, if culture is the controlling force, its 376 clearest application is at a higher level rather than a lower level. Senior managers 377 are controlled by the firm culture, but the ability of senior management to use 378 culture to control subordinate members is questionable. Simply because lower-level 379 employees do not have the seniority, history, and background necessary to 380 understand the firm culture completely and to identify with it personally, therefore, 381 it is the culture that controls management, not the other way around [39]. 382

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3.2 Managers Can Reinforce Control with Organizational Culture

Many other researchers believe that managers can influence the values and beliefs shared by the members of the organization and control their behavior accordingly [38]. These theorists did not question the assumption that clan control is possible but attacked it on moral and ideological grounds.

Ideology is a system of thought that allows one group to rule over another. 389 Cultural domination refers to the process of engineering consensus by developing a 390 system that conveys and supports ideological beliefs. It is this well-designed con-391 sensus that raises false awareness and forms the focus of intense criticism of cul-392 tural change programs, total quality management, business process reengineering, 393 and other popular management initiatives that use participatory rhetoric to gain 394 worker support [40]. For instance, family control is depicted as an ideology 395 designed to support the hegemony of managers coming from the same family. 396 Non-managers accepted and practiced this ideology, so they fell into a false con-397 sciousness and gave up their own interests to pursue the interests of the family. 398 Some researchers interpret those organizations as neo-Marxism. 399

The standardization and coordination process helps routinize work activities to be consistent with the organization's strategy and goals. However, when managers neglect the need for autonomy, organizations suffer from a lack of innovation [41-43].

3.3 Interaction of Ideology and Control

Recently, the concept of ideology has been grabbed by organizational scholars and applied to management practice. Some researchers see ideology as a negative approach to control. In contrast, others see the positive aspects of ideology; ideology is a medium by which people make history a conscious actor, whether in an organization or within a country [44]. In this sense, ideology should be regarded as an important tool for change, rather than an obstacle like the traditional definition.

In an ideological organization, participation depends on a sense of identity (for example, the positioning of a leader by a loyal follower). Members maintain participation in ideological organizations because they believe in the organization's purpose, feel personal satisfaction, and enjoy increased self-esteem due to participation.

The control itself is an ideology. In other words, one of the ways to maintain hegemony in an organization is to support the dominance of top management through a control structure. Therefore, the belief that control is essential to the success of an organization gives powerful people the right to dominate. This belief can be described as an ideology-control ideology. Reinterpreting all organizational theories from an ideological perspective is one of the important topics put forward by postmodern organizational theorists.

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4 What Response Can Indigenous Research Methods Give to Those Challenges?

The question of reviewing managerial control theories and reconceptualizing 424 management control models has fostered intense debate in recent years. Several 425 scholars have pointed out that the common body of knowledge on managerial 426 control currently available so far has not managed to embrace the complexity of 427 managerial control systems [45, 46]. Also, Otley [46] noted that managerial control 428 theory has long been criticized for its undefined theoretical foundations, particularly 429 regarding rationality being a fundamental concept in managerial control theory. 430 One of the main criticisms of traditional managerial control theory is its incapacity 431 to provide a holistic, unified, and consistent model that embeds contradictions so 432 that they can be an integral part of the model itself instead of being a limitation of 433 the model itself. There is evidence in recent literature that the traditional view on 434 managerial control, based on a scientific perspective, would need to be confronted 435 against a more holistic and human-based view. 436

Despite many publications related to the *Contingency Theory of Performance Management Systems*, the literature in management accounting has implicitly
 focused on a deterministic and objective understanding of control systems instead
 of acknowledging their complex and holistic nature. Studies remain compart mented, in particular, because the disciplines of organizational behavior, psychol ogy, and social sciences, in general, may lack the level of practicality required in
 management disciplines like accounting.

444 4.1 Indigenous Management Research

Would alternative research methods, like Indigenous Management Research (IMR), be able to path the way towards a more multidisciplinary approach and holistic view of managerial control systems? How could those methods help embrace alternative paradigmatic assumptions so as to rethink managerial control systems in the contemporary global context? By facilitating the emergence of new theories, IMR helps to respond to increasing complexity [47].

Advocates of IMR argue that suitable methodologies are necessary to create new 451 knowledge where existing theories cannot provide a suitable response to a partic-452 ular problem or phenomenon. Leung argued that IMR could contribute to the 453 development of universal theories. However, experts insist that IMR should be able 454 to follow some principles in order to achieve this role [48]. In particular, IMR 455 should address the need for the complementarity of qualitative and quantitative 456 methods to help develop and validate new concepts from empirical research and 457 should adopt a multi-level perspective to develop an understanding of the new 458 phenomena [49]. Jing and Ven emphasize the unique attribute of indigenous re-459 search to reflect the uniqueness of local constructs and contexts [47]. Li et al. 460 (2012) stated that IMR must bring a local (*emic*) perspective as opposed to a foreign 461

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(etic) point of view and should refrain from building universal principles or 462 knowledge [50]. IMR also requires a relationship between scholars and practi-463 tioners involving negotiation and collaboration in a learning community, promoted 464 by supporters of Engaged Scholarship. Van de Ven defines Engaged Scholarship as 465 "a participative form of research for obtaining the views of key stakeholders to 466 understand a complex problem in its particular context', then doing research "more 467 penetrating and insightful" [47, 51]. He argued that emic inquiry can be as 468 objective and valid as etic research and provided several examples of engaged 469 indigenous research works to support his views. 470

IMR builds its foundation on qualitative research methods, whose methods and 471 procedures have been the subject of numerous publications in the late eighties and 472 nineties. Eisenhardt proposed a process of building theory from case study research 473 and argued that empirical inductive qualitative research is an especially appropriate 474 approach in new topic areas, where the resultant theory is "often novel, testable, and 475 empirically valid" [52]. In this perspective, investigators in theory-building case 476 study research should formulate a research problem and possibly specify some 477 potentially important variables, with some reference to existent literature. Quanti-478 tative methods can be used as a research method only when concepts have reached 479 a certain level of maturity. 480

Indigenous Knowledge is often defined as the opposite of scientific knowledge, still contributing to scientific, theory-based knowledge by allowing to form new scientific knowledge. Some authors emphasized the distinctive role of theory in qualitative research as relating to the expression of a subjective reality more than the clarification of an objective one [53]. According to Tsui, it is necessary to distinguish between various sources of knowledge depending on their relevance to the context and understand how they complement each other [54].

Indigenous methods of management research have been advocated to reduce 488 western-centric theories of management. Western centric theories are based on a 489 values system adapted to western societies. Therefore those approaches (or even 490 philosophies) gave actionable solutions to the phenomenon studied [48]. Meyer 491 declared that "more management research should be able to make major contribu-492 493 tions, for instance, by explaining context-specific variables and effects and by drawing on traditional Asian thought in developing new theories" [55]. Holtbrüggge 494 argued that management theories are not adequately reflected by traditional Western 495 and called for more context-specific research for drawing on indigenous thought to 496 ensure that new theories who better fit to emerging markets [56]. Tsui argued for the 497 need for high-quality indigenous research in building the body of global management 498 knowledge, using influential studies on management in the Chinese context [54]. In 499 his view, both context-specific research and context-embedded research are needed 500 in international management knowledge and should comprise three types of models: 501 context-free, context-bounded, and context-specific. A multi-level approach is 502 required in building global management knowledge by combining several sources of 503 management knowledge with various degrees of contextualization, including 504 context-specific indigenous management knowledge. IMR would then play a critical 505 role in building global management knowledge. 506

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4.2 What Is Indigenous Management Research?

Eisenhardt [52] indicates that "building theory from case studies is a research 508 strategy that involves using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, 509 proposition and/or midrange theory form case-based, empirical evidence." She 510 also stresses the unique characteristic of theory building from cases: "(...) emphasis 511 is in developing constructs, measures, and testable theoretical propositions makes 512 inductive research consistent with the emphasis on testable theory within main-513 stream deductive research." She notes the importance of creating theoretical con-514 structs from empirical evidence and argues that investigators in theory-building 515 case study research should possibly specify some potentially important variables, 516 whether derived from existent literature or from practical concerns. 517

IMR can be defined as "the study of a unique local phenomenon or a unique 518 element of any local phenomenon from a local perspective to explore its local 519 relevance, and, if possible, its global relevance as well" [50]. Those authors also 520 explained the role of IMR in relation to Western theories: "A study that examines a 521 local phenomenon entirely with a modified or expanded Western theory informed 522 by a local perspective, it may qualify as indigenous because the research con-523 tributes to theory development by adoption of a local perspective." They noted that, 524 however, "a study that examines a local phenomenon from the perspective of 525 Western theories or constructs cannot qualify as indigenous (...)" and proposed a 526 typology of IMR based on the nature of the local phenomenon and the source of 527 theoretical perspective, as well as an integrative framework of IMR. 528

According to the current literature, IMR has the following main characteristics as compared to other qualitative research methods:

- The importance of integration of both positivism and constructivism in the approach;
- The focus on context is essential because context-specific research allows "to ground the phenomenon up close and in sufficient detail to capture its unique essence, and theory";
- Once the indigenous construct elaborated, adapted quantitative measures should be produced to allow empirical research; and
- The relationship between the researcher and the participants in conducting indigenous research projects must be restated, arguing that researchers are most likely to be able to advance current theory and practice through active Engaged Scholarship.

542 4.3 IMR in Managerial Control Theory Today

Several authors noticed that Ancient Chinese theories of control might provide a good example of the potential contributions of IMR in the field of managerial control. The researchers in [58] have provided evidence of practices of managerial

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able 5 Research toward indigenous management				
Project phase	Outcomes	Research methods		
1. Theory grounding (mostly qualitative) - content-based	 Making use of field notes to record the impressions occurring in the observed phenomena Crafting instruments and protocols for multiple data collection Developing a theoretical model based on a priori constructs Creating data structure 	 Empirical, inductive Multiple data collection methods Qualitative data (surveys, group observations, and focus group session) Quantitative data (quasi-experimental methods) Triangulation of evidence 		
2. Theory testing (mostly quantitative)	 Analysis of mediation or moderation Developing hypotheses on core relations of the theory of peripheral elements or context Finding behavioral patterns Elicitation of individual preferences 	 Scenario-based experiments and/or classroom experiments (computer-based) Statistical methods 		
3. Theory-building (mostly qualitative) process-based	 Analyzing within-case data Searching for cross-case patterns in order to shape hypotheses Building internal validity, raising the theoretical level, and sharpening construct definitions Sharpening generalizability, improving construct definition 	 Multiple data collection Within-case analysis Triangulation of data Cross-case pattern search using divergent techniques Iterative tabulation of evidence for each construct 		

	Table 3	Research	toward	indigenous	management
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546 control compared to Western theories, by using ethnographic methods, more than 547 grounded research, and through extensive content analysis and triangulation.

548 IMR might still be, however, in its infancy in the field of managerial control. 549 Some may argue that this may be the result of excessive compartmentalization in 550 management disciplines towards accounting but also due to an excessive focus on 551 quantitative research in accounting research.

Table 3 provides an example of the different steps that could apply when investigating managerial control concepts under the IMR methodology, based on some recent research works conducted at the University of Strasbourg (BETA Laboratory) by a group of researchers involved in managerial control.

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559 **5 Conclusion**

This chapter reviewed some of the classical managerial control approaches and their links with theories of the firm. We conclude this chapter by proposing a more holistic approach based on local philosophies or ideologies that fit better firms

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depending on their organizational culture. Many researchers pinpointed that western and eastern cultural differences in management should be overcome or combined to obtain a more balanced approach to managerial control.

Core Messages

- Agency-based control theory cannot be applied in an uncertain world where innovation and creativity are key.
- Many managerial control approaches are mixed with hierarchical control, market control, and clan/group control.
- The temptation to use organizational culture or even national culture to reinforce control is high in many countries.
- Several researchers claim that control must be adapted to local climate and culture, giving rise to indigenous research.
- The general design of indigenous research is close to classical methodology.
- Indigenous researchers give much more importance to small signs and weak signals, like researchers in complexity frameworks.

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