Promoting shore-power via evolutionary game: Impacts of energy structures and power supplies

Shore power promotion is shaped not only by policy interventions, but also by heterogeneous external energy-related conditions. To examine how policy instruments, initial strategic preferences, and energy-related conditions shape the evolutionary dynamics of shore power adoption, this paper develops a four-party evolutionary game model involving governments, power companies, terminal operators, and shipping companies. The results indicate that penalty levels within certain ranges can effectively incentivize shore power adoption, while, within the present model setting and under the same government budget constraint, electricity price subsidies tend to show stronger effects than facility subsidies. A combined subsidy-penalty policy mix yields superior outcomes in promoting coordinated adoption. Players' willingness for promotion increases with stronger national policy commitment to photovoltaic development, reflecting industrial spillover effects. While, high petroleum sector reliance and severe electricity supply constraints, manifested through frequent power outages, suppress players' incentives. The adoption of clean alternative fuels by ships reduces government's incentives for the promotion.