Policy-driven pricing and cost allocation structures for third-party platforms in supervising construction environmental pollution

In the shift toward digital supervision in construction, third-party platforms now oversee environmental pollution on sites. These public service platforms depend on government leadership and policy support, yet research on their pricing structure is limited. This study explores how policies affect the pricing of such platforms by examining stakeholder roles and supervision models. Using a game model, it analyzes how government policies can share platform costs, reduce access risks for construction units, and balance the interests of all parties while ensuring platform profit. The study finds that enterprises often gain benefits from government policies that far exceed their access costs, with large-scale projects earning up to 40 times more than the cost of access. This significant return drives intense competition among construction projects for platform entry. To manage the resulting congestion, platforms raise access fees. The research also identifies an optimal cost allocation strategy, where the government assumes platform construction and operation costs, takes on access risks, and uses a non-monetary reward–punishment policy to guide participation. Furthermore, basic subsidies and differentiated management policies impact registration fees by accounting for network externalities and construction pollution liability.