Impact Assessment of Distributed Secondary Control Schemes for Autonomous AC Microgrids Under Multipoint FDI Attacks on Q-V Droop

Following the gradual maturity of the autonomous AC microgrid technology, the security and robustness of power electronic-based distributed energy resources are becoming increasingly important. Cyberattack on the microgrid hierarchical control layers is a growing concern. In this paper, the impacts of False Data Injection (FDI) cyber-attacks onto the secondary control layer that is comprised of the well-established distributed consensus control schemes, i.e., distributed dispatch control and distributed virtual output impedance (VOI) control, are compressively assessed respectively. The assessment focuses on FDI attacks on the Q-V droop structure, which is rarely investigated to date. The analysis is benchmarked against the centralized control scheme. All the considered schemes shared to the widest possible extent the same inner voltage and current control loops, thereby improving the validity of comparison and discussion. Disturbances of the point of common coupling's phase voltage magnitude and reactive power are discussed, and the relative resilience of the considered secondary control schemes is drawn, providing evidence to support the development of a resilient AC microgrid system.