TY - CONF
T1 - FROM PRO-GROWTH COALITION TO POST-STATE ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND BACK? THE NEW TREND OF URBAN (RE)DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
AU - Wang, Xuefeng
AU - Wang, Yiwen
AU - Sun, Lei
PY - 2025/7/7
Y1 - 2025/7/7
N2 - The last decade has witnessed two significant “U-turns” in China’s urban development policy. In 2015, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s (CCPCC) Conference on City Affairs emphasized the market’s leading role in the redevelopment of shantytowns and old residential neighborhoods under the New Approach to Urbanization strategy, advancing a “pro-growth coalition” policy. However, just one year later, the CCPCC’s 2016 Conference on Economic Affairs shifted toward state interventionism, encapsulated by the doctrine that “housing is for living in, not for speculative investment.” This shift led to the introduction of restrictive measures, such as limits on housing purchases and a move away from mass demolition and redevelopment in favor of micro-renewal strategies. The subsequent slowdown in economic growth, exacerbated by the three-year lockdown to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, burst the housing market bubble. In response, a new round of incentives for property-led urban (re)development was reintroduced in 2023. This policy envisions the clearance of most urban villages and the redevelopment of areas deemed to have low efficiency. All restrictions on housing purchases and mass demolition have now been lifted. Once again, the aim is to stimulate domestic demand and drive economic growth. However, in a context where the housing market is in decline, the pro-growth coalition between local governments and capital has weakened, and local state entrepreneurialism has shifted toward authoritarianism, this latest policy U-turn warrants thorough scrutiny. This paper seeks to investigate how local governments are responding to this new policy reorientation, using the case of Suzhou as a focal point.
AB - The last decade has witnessed two significant “U-turns” in China’s urban development policy. In 2015, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s (CCPCC) Conference on City Affairs emphasized the market’s leading role in the redevelopment of shantytowns and old residential neighborhoods under the New Approach to Urbanization strategy, advancing a “pro-growth coalition” policy. However, just one year later, the CCPCC’s 2016 Conference on Economic Affairs shifted toward state interventionism, encapsulated by the doctrine that “housing is for living in, not for speculative investment.” This shift led to the introduction of restrictive measures, such as limits on housing purchases and a move away from mass demolition and redevelopment in favor of micro-renewal strategies. The subsequent slowdown in economic growth, exacerbated by the three-year lockdown to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, burst the housing market bubble. In response, a new round of incentives for property-led urban (re)development was reintroduced in 2023. This policy envisions the clearance of most urban villages and the redevelopment of areas deemed to have low efficiency. All restrictions on housing purchases and mass demolition have now been lifted. Once again, the aim is to stimulate domestic demand and drive economic growth. However, in a context where the housing market is in decline, the pro-growth coalition between local governments and capital has weakened, and local state entrepreneurialism has shifted toward authoritarianism, this latest policy U-turn warrants thorough scrutiny. This paper seeks to investigate how local governments are responding to this new policy reorientation, using the case of Suzhou as a focal point.
M3 - Paper
ER -
