Equal Employment Opportunity Statement and underpricing in Initial Public Offerings

Jin Huang*, Yucheng Huang, Fengshi Jing, Ziang Wang, Bingqing Zhao

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

There has been an increasing emphasis from society and capital markets on a firm's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) practices. We examine the impact of firms’ EEO statements in the prospectus on their underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Based on the textual analysis of 915 Hong Kong IPO prospectus, this research finds that a strong emphasis on EEO is linked to reduced IPO underpricing. We also find that the effectiveness of EEO signals diminishes in a noisy signalling environment, while a firm's traditional costly signals, including firm size and cornerstone investors, substitute the signal effectiveness of the EEO statements. The study contributes to the signalling theory by highlighting the role of the EEO statement as an effective signal to firm value and elucidating how the signalling effectiveness of EEO varies under different environments and firm-level conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104381
JournalInternational Review of Financial Analysis
Volume106
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2025

Keywords

  • Agency problem
  • EEO
  • IPO underpricing
  • Signalling theory

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