TY - GEN
T1 - Enhancing the security of numeric comparison secure simple pairing in bluetooth 5.0
AU - Hou, Dongkun
AU - Zhang, Jie
AU - Man, Ka Lok
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/12
Y1 - 2020/12
N2 - Bluetooth wireless technology is widely deployed in consumer electronics such as mobile phones, headsets, medical wearables and so on. Security is a significant concern of users, since such devices collect and store personal data. Security schemes are provided in the Bluetooth Core Specification version 5.0, but they cannot resist the emerging side-channel attacks which can leak long-term secrets through physical manners. In this paper, the security of Bluetooth under side-channel attacks is studied. Specifically, we improved the security of Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) protocol in Bluetooth 5.0 by developing two leakage-resilient methods to resist side-channel attacks. The leakage-resilient SSP protocols are designed using exponent splitting and multiplicative mask leakage-resilient methods respectively to prevent the long-term secrets from being leaked to side-channel attackers. Prototypes of the new and original protocols are realized, and we simulate a set of experiences to evaluate and compare their performance. We find the increased computation cost of the new protocols is slight and acceptable.
AB - Bluetooth wireless technology is widely deployed in consumer electronics such as mobile phones, headsets, medical wearables and so on. Security is a significant concern of users, since such devices collect and store personal data. Security schemes are provided in the Bluetooth Core Specification version 5.0, but they cannot resist the emerging side-channel attacks which can leak long-term secrets through physical manners. In this paper, the security of Bluetooth under side-channel attacks is studied. Specifically, we improved the security of Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) protocol in Bluetooth 5.0 by developing two leakage-resilient methods to resist side-channel attacks. The leakage-resilient SSP protocols are designed using exponent splitting and multiplicative mask leakage-resilient methods respectively to prevent the long-term secrets from being leaked to side-channel attackers. Prototypes of the new and original protocols are realized, and we simulate a set of experiences to evaluate and compare their performance. We find the increased computation cost of the new protocols is slight and acceptable.
KW - Bluetooth 5.0
KW - Leakage resilience
KW - Numeric comparison
KW - Secure simple pairing
KW - Side-channel attack
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85101274326
U2 - 10.1109/TrustCom50675.2020.00224
DO - 10.1109/TrustCom50675.2020.00224
M3 - Conference Proceeding
AN - SCOPUS:85101274326
T3 - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2020
SP - 1622
EP - 1629
BT - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2020
A2 - Wang, Guojun
A2 - Ko, Ryan
A2 - Bhuiyan, Md Zakirul Alam
A2 - Pan, Yi
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 19th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2020
Y2 - 29 December 2020 through 1 January 2021
ER -